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People’s threat perceptions play a role in influencing foreign policies towards perceived adversary countries. 
Earlier research has identified multiple components shaping mass-level threat perceptions including military 
power, adversary country’s perceived intentions, and national identities. On the individual level, education, 
use of media, and interest in politics have been shown to influence threat perceptions. However, most studies 
on perceptions of security threats fail to include both contextual and individual-level explanatory factors and 
to consider that different national threats may be constructed differently. This research bridges formation of 
threat perceptions on the individual level to wider societal processes and provides an empirical perspective 
to understanding threat perceptions among the educated section of the Chinese population. To analyze threat 
perceptions, students from leading Chinese universities (N = 771) took part in a survey in the autumn of 2011 
and spring of 2012. Respondents who followed conventional media were more likely to perceive both the United 
States and Japan as threatening, and the effect of media consumption was particularly strong with regards 
to perceived threat from Japan. In addition, each threat perception was significantly associated with threat-
specific explanatory factors. Potential explanatory factors of threat perceptions were explored with linear 
regression models.
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Mass perceptions of threat can significantly influence a country’s foreign policy. A high degree 
of perceived security threat can give support to “hard-line” policies against a perceived enemy as ex-
ternal threat increases ingroup cohesion and evokes attitudes backing aggressive responses towards 
outgroups (Brewer, 1999; Cottam & Cottam, 2001; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Moskalenko, 
McCauley, & Rozin, 2006). Second, a high degree of perceived security threat helps to mobilize 
people in dealing with the perceived threat (Chen, 2001; Cohen, 1978; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990).
Perceived security threats have been studied both from International Relations (IR) as well as 
psychological perspectives, which tend to emphasize different levels of analysis: IR research focuses 
on international systemic factors and states whereas psychology scrutinizes the individual. Realist 
theorists in IR (Kennedy, 1987; Waltz, 1979) and realist conflict theorists in social psychology 
(Sherif, 1966) relate perceptions of security threats to power asymmetries. In the 1980s, scholars in 
IR began increasingly looking at intention as a source of threat, which helped to understand psycho-
logical components of threat perceptions in addition to material elements (Stein, 2013). According 
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to Walt’s (1987, p. 22) influential definition, military threat is a function of four elements: military 
power, offensive capability, geographical proximity, and aggressive intentions.
In the study of threat perceptions, perceived security threat is often defined as consisting both 
of elements of capability and intention to harm (Chen, 2001; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Jervis, 1976; 
Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992). Over the years, IR approaches highlighting nonmaterial factors in threat 
formation have gained ground. In the 1990s, social constructivists emphasized that identities influ-
ence threat perceptions: A shared identity or similarity can reduce or eliminate threat perceptions 
(Wendt, 1999). The role of identities has later been proven empirically (Gries, Zhang, Crowson, & 
Cai, 2011; Rousseau, 2006). The political nature of security and threats got attention among schol-
ars who formed securitization theory. They argued that classifying something as a threat to national 
security is a political choice rather than an objective fact, highlighting the possibility of politically 
manipulating security measures. Using the word “security” creates an action priority and calls for ex-
ceptional measures to prevent undesirable outcomes (Buzan, 1983; Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998).
The ways in which people respond to dominant definitions of threats in national discourses 
depend on various factors. It has been established that level of education (Gries & Sanders, 2015) 
and media use (Chen, 2001; Gries & Sanders, 2015; Ridout, Grosse, & Appleton, 2008) influence 
the formation of threat perceptions at the individual level. More generally, psychological studies on 
decision-making have challenged the rational actor model, which used to be the dominant way to 
present human behavior in most of IR. The cognitive approach in psychology acknowledges that the 
world is complex, but people’s mental capacities are limited in meeting standards of ideal rationality. 
Thus, people adopt various cognitive shortcuts or heuristics, which, while essential, often lead to 
false conclusions (Levy, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Uncovering the “bounded rationality” 
of human thinking was important in building a more accurate picture of cognitive processes driving 
human behavior (Chong, 2013). Acknowledging the limits of cognitive processing enable a more 
nuanced understanding of security dynamics by improving knowledge on the individuals who form 
threat perceptions.
As described above, previous research has identified multiple components shaping perceptions 
of security threats on individual and collective levels. Some of the complexities involved in the 
process of forming threat perceptions have been operationalized in research frameworks. Garcia-
Retamero, Müller, and Rousseau (2012) showed that threat perceptions are affected by material fac-
tors and identities simultaneously. Some studies have also recognized that understanding the sources 
of anti-outgroup perceptions necessitates combining both contextual and individual-level explan-
atory characteristics because people react to societal input differently (Pettigrew, 2006; Schlueter 
& Scheepers, 2010; Stein, 2013). Gries and Sanders (2015) studied the interaction of personal and 
situational variables to demonstrate that personal interest plays a role in the way news-media content 
influences Chinese respondents’ threat perceptions of the United States. Finally, there is some re-
search comparing threat perceptions of different foreign countries. Chen’s (2001) research provides 
a rare analysis of factors influencing Chinese threat perceptions of both the United States and Japan. 
However, none of the studies mentioned includes personal and situational variables in the context of 
two different national threats. This study has this combination of elements, to investigate whether 
personal and situational factors interact differently regarding different national threats.
There are also empirical imbalances to which this research aims to contribute. Mainstream IR 
literature is abundant in texts describing various kinds of threats China is perceived to pose to other 
countries ranging from growing military power and lack of democracy to economic development 
(Huntington, 1996; Mearsheimer, 2006, 2010; Yee & Storey, 2002). However, Chinese threat per-
ceptions of other countries have been analyzed much less. Yet, threat perceptions influence politi-
cal processes in authoritarian countries even without general elections. The CCP must take public 
opinion into account in its policymaking due to legitimacy needs. Especially issues related to Japan 
evoke a strong response from the Chinese public (He, 2009; Jakobson & Knox, 2010; Reilly, 2012). 
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Even before the strengthened U.S.-Japan military alliance in 2015 and changes Donald Trump’s 
presidency has brought for the Asian security architecture, it seemed clear to most Chinese that the 
United States and Japan were the two most threatening countries to China.
This article provides a snapshot of how elite university students gauge military threat from the 
United States and Japan. Chinese elite university students form an interesting group to analyze be-
cause they have been subject to patriotic education, and the state has created an effective system for 
controlling students (Wang, 2012; Yan, 2014). On the other hand, their educational background has 
provided them with more information on many issues in comparison to the less educated parts of the 
population. As the survey analyzed in this article was collected in 2011–12, just before Xi Jinping’s 
ascent to power, it can provide a point of comparison for subsequent studies. There is reason to as-
sume that rivalry perceptions in China may have become more common after 2012 due to the tense 
situation in the South China Sea and Korean Peninsula in 2017 followed by a trade war with the 
United States in 2018.
Interpretive Aspects of Threats
This research builds its understanding of perceived security threats on answering two inter-
linked questions: What constitutes a threat and which factors increase the likelihood of perceiving 
something as a threat? In this research, external security threat is defined as perceived capacity and 
intention to harm China.
This article contributes to our understanding of the interrelationships between psychological 
and political processes in the following ways. First, the theoretical framework and associated meth-
odology combine contextual and individual-level factors and join formation of threat perceptions on 
the individual level to wider societal and political processes. Second, by making visible some of the 
ways in which cognitive processes matter in forming threat perceptions, this article helps to comple-
ment the adversary-focused research on threats. Acknowledging what happens at the individual level 
highlights the need to include ideational factors in the analysis of threats. Because both material and 
ideational elements shape perceptions of security threats, these threats should not therefore be treated 
as objective sets of conditions. Rather, perceiving necessarily entails interpretation.
Perceptions of national threats observed at the individual level are constructed through interac-
tion of elements on the individual, societal, and international levels. In this interaction of psycho-
logical and political processes, individual-level factors, such as style of information processing and 
knowledge, interact with the surrounding society and international components resulting in threat 
perceptions. The social level mediates between the individual and national/international levels. 
People’s inherent “groupness” entails natural differentiation between ingroups and outgroups, which 
can also be exploited for political purposes. Political systems and their leaders are well aware that 
perceived common threat from outgroups increases ingroup cohesion and loyalty (Brewer, 1999). 
These themes are discussed in more detail below. Figure 1 summarizes material and ideational ele-
ments on both foreign and domestic levels to form a comprehensive picture of factors contributing to 
formation of threat perceptions.
Material Factors
Material factors provide the basis for mass-scale threat perceptions. In analyzing Chinese threat 
perceptions of the United States and Japan, military power dynamics in China’s geographical prox-
imity are important to consider. The United States remains the world’s most capable military power. 
Despite China’s recent military modernization and growing defense budgets, it still lags far behind 
the United States in defense spending (SIPRI, 2018). The U.S. military presence in Asia remains 
significant, and it maintains military bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
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Japan’s military is technologically advanced, but from China’s perspective, Japan is mainly 
threatening due to its military alliance with the United States and historical aggression against China, 
which raises doubts about Japan’s future intentions (Sinkkonen, 2019). Japan and the United States 
have deepened their security alliance since the mid-1990s and Japan has gradually taken more re-
sponsibility for its own defense (Christensen, 1999).
What is more, Japan and China have a territorial dispute regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
in the East China Sea, and the situation was acute at the time survey material for this study was col-
lected. A deepening downward spiral in Sino-Japanese relations started in 2010 when Japan arrested 
the captain of a Chinese fishing boat, which had collided with Japanese Coast Guard vessels. This 
resulted in a direct official confrontation for the first time (Nakano, 2016). In 2012, the Japanese 
government decided to buy the islands to prevent Tokyo’s right-wing Governor, Shintaro Ishihara, 
from doing the same.
According to polls, the United States and Japan are viewed as threats to China. Based on results 
from a dataset collected in Beijing in 1999, Chen (2001) found that an overwhelming majority of 
respondents considered the United States and Japan as threats to China in terms of both intention and 
capability. More recently, U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey (N = 2597) found that 63% of 
respondents believed the United States poses the greatest threat to China, and Japan was the second 
most threatening country. The more educated respondents were more likely to view the United States 
as the biggest threat (Gries & Sanders, 2015). In all the Beijing-Tokyo forum (2017) polls conducted 
between 2008 and 2016, Japan and the United States were perceived as more threatening compared 
to any other country. Trends in Chinese threat perceptions in the Beijing-Tokyo forum’s polls are 
presented in Figure 2.1
Identity and Core Values
While there may be yardsticks to evaluate offensive capabilities, assessment of “aggressive in-
tentions” is less straightforward. The more similar a country is to one’s own, the less threatening peo-
ple feel it is. According to Rousseau (2006), a sense of shared identity is negatively correlated with 
threat perception. Identity conditions threat perceptions so strongly that material balance of power 
calculations become less relevant. On the other hand, people who attach to the nation more deeply 
1Unfortunately, the question wording was changed in 2015 making it incomparable with earlier samples, which is why results 
after 2015 are left out of this figure.
Figure 1. Factors contributing to formation of threat perceptions on different levels of analysis.
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tend to feel threats more intensely and hate enemies more than people who attach to the nation less 
strongly (Cottam & Cottam, 2001; Herrmann, Isernia, & Segatti, 2009).
Identities can be operationalized via core values linked with particular identities. Social psy-
chological theories about values argue that core values are important determinants of subsequent 
political orientations and behavior (Feldman, 2003). They also theorize that values are organized as 
value structures based on the individual’s salience of values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). In the 
context of understanding links between values and foreign policy attitudes, Hurwitz’s and Peffley’s 
(1987) hierarchical model of foreign policy belief systems shows that general foreign policy core val-
ues, such as nationalism, constrain more general foreign policy beliefs such as postures and images 
of other nations. These images in turn shape attitudes toward specific foreign policies. Thus, core 
values can be assumed to be linked with threat perceptions.
Ways to define and study core values, such as nationalism and patriotism, are subject to contin-
uous debate. Scholars such as Connor (1994) have insisted on treating nationalism and patriotism 
strictly as separate concepts, but others, such as Smith (2009), hold that the concepts have significant 
overlap. Others, like Billig (1995), deny that nationalism and patriotism can be treated as separate 
concepts. Nationalism and patriotism can take a wide variety of forms and evolve over time (Delanty 
& Kumar, 2006; Gustafsson, 2016). In part, degree of fluidity allowed for definitions depends on 
research philosophy and associated methods. In 1989, Kosterman and Feshbach published one of the 
first widely cited pieces of research analyzing patriotism and nationalism empirically with survey 
material. Their conclusion, based on principal factor analysis, was that patriotism and nationalism 
can be regarded as empirically distinct.
The Chinese government (2006) regards patriotism as a civic virtue, although their definition of 
it would match more with the nationalism scale than the patriotism scale used in this study. In 2006, 
patriotism was defined as one of the core values of the so-called socialist core values system, and its 
importance has been emphasized regularly (Hu, 2012; see Gustafsson, 2016 for a discussion of the 
Chinese government’s efforts to define patriotism). Gries et al. (2011) and Sinkkonen (2013) have 
studied nationalism and patriotism and their links to other attitudes in the context of Chinese core 
values. Both studies base their measurements of patriotism and nationalism on scales Kosterman 
and Feshbach (1989) developed. Kosterman and Feshbach find that “patriotism” and “nationalism” 
Figure 2. Chinese perceptions of military threat from the United States and Japan in the Beijing-Tokyo forum polls. Figures 
are percentages of respondents who feel that the United States and Japan pose military threats to China. [Colour figure can be 
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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can be regarded as empirically distinct. They define “patriotism” as feelings of attachment to one’s 
country and “nationalism” as the view that one’s country is superior and should be dominant.
Gries et al. (2011) and Sinkkonen (2013) show that unlike in some other countries, nationalism 
and patriotism are distinct constructs in Chinese student samples. In addition, nationalism is more 
strongly related to foreign policy preferences in comparison to patriotism. Gries et al. also identified 
a positive correlation between nationalism and military threat in their structural equation model 
indicating that respondents who received high scores on the nationalism scale were more likely to 
view the United States as threatening. Research by Shi, Lu, and Aldrich (2011) also supports the 
above-mentioned findings. In their study, a nationalistic orientation was significantly affiliated with 
negative evaluations of American policies toward China.
Research shows that nationalist views are common in China. Many Chinese feel that especially 
after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has ascended to be a first-class power in the world and 
should be treated as such (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012). Chinese citizens rank higher on nationalism 
scales compared with respondents from other countries (Tang & Darr, 2012). Nationalistic citizens 
tend to picture a more prominent stance for China, which also increases the likelihood of conflicts 
with its adversaries and consequently the feeling of being threatened by the United States and Japan.
Previous research shows a link between core values, such as nationalism, and foreign policy 
attitudes. It is therefore proposed that:
H1: The more nationalist respondents are, the more likely they are to view the United States and 
Japan as threats to China.
Media Consumption and Interest in Politics
As attitude formation is a complex process, material factors, social identities, and values are 
not the only factors that influence issue specific attitudes, such as threat perceptions. In addition 
to the above, characteristics of the domestic context, such as the media environment, shape threat 
perceptions.
The media provides a channel for the public to interpret international events, but it also directs 
people’s attention and frames what to think about. Research shows that people are more reactive and 
attentive to negative than positive news. Consequently, news media around the world tends to suffer 
from negativity bias (Soroka & McAdams, 2015), which is not without consequences with regard to 
people’s thinking. Psychological studies have shown that people are not good at assessing probabilities 
intuitively and tend to apply availability heuristics when estimating the likelihood of events. In other 
words, people will try to recall examples of the event and if such examples come to mind easily, they 
tend to estimate the likelihood of the event higher (Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Negativity bias and availability heuristics apply also to threat perceptions. Security policies conducted 
by adversary countries are sometimes reported disproportionally painting an inaccurate picture of vari-
ous national threats. Ridout, Grosse, and Appleton (2008) show that media exposure heightens percep-
tions of threats of economic crisis, major war, weapons of mass destruction, global warming, population 
growth, and religious fanaticism. Reilly (2016) conducted a survey experiment on university students 
using threatening media coverage of U.S.-China and Japan-China relations as treatments. Students ex-
posed to the “national threat” media treatments were significantly more authoritarian and nationalist in 
their responses to subsequent survey questions than students not exposed to these treatments.
Chinese media mostly portrays the United States and Japan if not as actual threats, at least as 
potential threats to China (Brady, 2008; Shirk, 2011; Stockmann, 2011). Despite top-down control, 
the Chinese media landscape has been shaped by marketization leading to increased numbers of 
negative stories on the United States and Japan, as these stories attract consumers and increase sales. 
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Regarding all media types, it has been established that the tone of reporting on the United States and 
Japan has turned more negative (Stockmann, 2011). In 2011, newspaper editors reported that inter-
national news was very popular among readers and only second to sports, according to their market 
research. Global Times, which has been criticized of promoting xenophobic nationalism, was one of 
the most profitable publications in China (Shirk, 2011). Even the Party papers are nowadays depen-
dent on sales (Hao, 2013; Stockmann, 2011).
In addition to news media, entertainment transmits negative stereotypes. Television is used for 
articulating a Chinese national identity and promoting Chinese nationalism as an ideology (Song, 
2015). Negative content on Japan and the Japanese are ubiquitous in Chinese TV dramas. In 2012 
alone, State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television approved 69 anti-Japanese television se-
ries and about 100 films for production (Lague & Lee, 2013). In comparison, outright negative and 
threatening depictions of Americans are much less prevalent in Chinese entertainment television 
even though they are common in news media.
In a context where media coverage on the United States and Japan is mostly negative, we can 
expect an increase in negative views on these countries among those who follow the media. Thus, it 
is proposed that:
H2: Those who follow “mainstream” media such as television, the People’s Daily, or Party pub-
lications are more likely to view the United States and Japan as threats.
However, regardless of what the media reports and how it does it, threat perceptions are affected 
by the way individuals gather and evaluate information, that is, individuals’ issue attentiveness and 
responsiveness to external influences. According to the exposure-acceptance model, there is a curvi-
linear relation between attentiveness and persuasion power of the message transmitted, which means 
in practice that well-informed people are hard to persuade because they have strong prior views on 
issues and better ability to critically evaluate external messages. Poorly aware citizens for their part 
are hard to persuade because they do not pay attention to external messages such as the media. Thus, 
most likely to be persuaded are people who have some prior knowledge on the issue area in question, 
but whose opinions have some flexibility (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992). Often level of awareness 
can be linked with level of education (Kennedy, 2009; McGuire, 1968).
The exposure-acceptance model was first developed in the Western political context, but it has 
later been tested in authoritarian regimes (Geddes & Zaller, 1989). Using the World Values Survey 
from the year 2000, Kennedy (2009) applied the exposure-acceptance model to China and demon-
strated that well-educated people in China are harder to influence than other groups.
Even though the highly educated tend to be less influenced by external messages, there is still 
variance within this group. Based on the U.S.-China Security Perception Survey, Gries and Sanders 
(2015) discovered that those who were highly interested in international affairs and followed the 
media a lot tended to perceive the United States as more threatening than others. These respondents 
were also more highly educated than other respondents. In contrast, respondents with low interest in 
international affairs saw the United States as less threatening the more news they followed, because 
they became more familiar with, and thus more trusting of, the countries they heard more about—
without paying too much attention to the possibly negative content of the news. Thus, Gries and 
Sanders argue that media consumption is defined by interest in politics, and they form separate factors.
This sample presents a hard case for the finding that interest in politics defines effects of media 
consumption, as it is comprised of the highly educated only. There is still likely to be variance among 
students’ interest in politics. It is proposed that:
H3: Those who are interested in politics are more likely to view the United States and Japan as 
threats.
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Methods
Sample
To find out student views on security threats, the corresponding author conducted a survey 
(N  =  771) in Shanghai Jiaotong University, Fudan University, Nanjing University and Zhejiang 
University in November and December 2011, and in Renmin University of China, Peking University, 
and Tsinghua University in March 2012. Except for Renmin University of China, these universities 
belong to the C9 league (jiuxiao lianmeng, 九校联盟) of Chinese top universities. Other scholars 
have selected these same universities as sampling sites for similar reasons (Chen, 2011; Zhao, 2003). 
As the samples were taken from elite universities, the results cannot be directly generalized to all 
Chinese students, not to mention the general population compared to which the participants were 
much more educated and younger. However, this survey gives us information on the views of China’s 
future elite and enables us to study the relationships between variables, which can later be tested with 
other types of samples.
The questionnaire used in the research was a modified version of the ISSP (International Social 
Survey Program) National Identity II questionnaire, which is an international standardized question-
naire used in 34 countries in 2003. For the analysis of threat perceptions, the questionnaire was 
changed to include elements from questionnaires used by Gries et al. (2011) and Fairbrother (2008). 
Owing to the political sensitivity of the research topic, this survey was conducted as a convenience 
sample in the university lecture halls used for studying when no teaching is going on.2 The lecture 
halls were selected based on their location on campus to get as representative a sample of students as 
possible. Participants did not receive any financial compensation for their participation. No faculty 
members were present during sampling giving respondents a degree of privacy in answering the 
questionnaire and ensuring their anonymity. Unlike face-to-face probability samples conducted in 
China, self-filled questionnaires may decrease respondents’ feeling of having to conform to social 
norms or hide their political views, which may increase data quality. According to Gries and Sanders 
(2015), many surveys on Chinese views of political issues suffer from compliance due to the face-to-
face interviewing method.
Sample Characteristics
Response rate of the sample was approximately 93%, and we obtained 771 valid responses. The 
participants’ gender ratio was approximately 56–44 (416 men and 325 women), 14% were from 
Fudan University (N = 94), 14% from Shanghai Jiaotong University (N = 94), 15% from Nanjing 
University (N = 104), 21% from Zhejiang University (N = 142), 8% were from Tsinghua University 
(N = 76), 11% from Peking University (N = 76), 9% from Renmin University of China (N = 63), and 
8% from other universities (N = 51).3 Twelve percent of respondents refused to report their home 
institution (N = 96). The respondents were in average 21 years old (ranging from 17 to 34 years), 182 
(25%) of them were members of the CCP or probationary members, 205 (28%) had applied or were 
planning to apply for the membership, and 347 (47%) were not members. Most students were study-
ing engineering (N = 140, 19%) or economics (N = 101, 14%). Of the participants, 131 (18%) had 
grown up in the countryside, 306 (42%) in a town or small city, 150 in a medium-sized city (20%), 
and the rest (N  =  151, 21%) had had an urban upbringing. Two hundred and sixty-nine (37%) 
2Almost all Chinese university students live in the campus area in dormitories, where four to eight people generally share a 
room. This makes it hard to study in the dormitory, so most students study in the empty lecture halls between lectures.
3These students from other universities happened to be at one of the three selected universities when the sampling was 
conducted.
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reported that their father had a university education and 212 (29%) that their mother had a university 
education. Respondents classified their own social status on average 5.7 on a 10-point scale (from 10 
low to 1 high). Their ethnic background was most often Han Chinese (N = 695, 93%), whereas 48 
respondents (7%) classified themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority. The general sample char-
acteristics as well as variables relevant for the analysis of threat perceptions presented below are 
summarized in Table 1.
Measures
Threat Perceptions
Perceptions of threat from the United States and Japan were measured with three and two items, 
respectively. Participants responded to these items on a 5-point Likert scale from 5 (strongly agree) 
to 1 (strongly disagree). Hurwitz and Peffley (1990), Peffley and Hurwitz (1992), and Chen (2001) 
have used similar statements to measure threat perceptions. The number after each statement indi-
cates its place in the questionnaire. Chinese versions of the statements can be found in the online 
supporting information.
The items measuring perceived threat from the United States were (Cronbach’s alpha .7):
1. America has hostile intentions against China. (29.2.)
2. America poses a threat to China in the military front. (29.5.)
3. A growing American military is bad for China. (29.7.)
The items measuring perceived threat from Japan were (Cronbach’s alpha .6):4
1. Japan has hostile intentions against China. (30.3.)
2. Japan poses a threat to China in the military front. (30.5.)
Most students (63%) were of the view that the United States has hostile intentions against China, 
and only 6% did not see the United States as having hostile intentions. An even greater number of 
students saw Japan as having hostile intentions against China (70%), with only 5% of respondents 
disagreeing. Many respondents were indecisive on this question and chose the middle option “neither 
agree nor disagree” regarding both the United States and Japan (31% in the case of the United States 
and 25% in the case of Japan).
The majority of respondents felt that both the United States and Japan pose a military threat to 
China. The threat from the United States was considered generally more severe than that of Japan. 
Sixty-four percent of respondents felt that the United States poses a military threat to China, whereas 
44% felt that way about Japan. Twenty-nine percent of respondents chose “neither agree nor dis-
agree” on the question of United States military threat, and 36% did the same on the question of 
Japanese military threat.
National Attachment, Media Consumption, and Interest in Politics
Following Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) research, in the survey presented below, “nation-
alism” is defined as a view according to which one’s country is superior to other countries and that 
4There is disagreement whether Cronbach’s alpha can be meaningfully used for two-item scales. See Eisinga, de Grotenhuis, 
and Pelzer (2013).
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provides for uncritical support of the home country’s actions; “patriotism,” on the other hand, is 
defined as a feeling of pride and emotional attachment to one’s country.
Nationalism and patriotism were both measured using seven items, and participants responded 
to these items on a 5-point Likert scale from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). Only state-
ment seven on the patriotism scale was measured on a scale in which 4 indicated “very close” and 
1 “not close at all.” Statements one, two, four, and six on the nationalism scale and statements one, 
four, and five on the patriotism scale were borrowed from the questionnaire used by Gries et al. 
(2011). Statement five on nationalism scale and statements two, three, and six were borrowed from 
the questionnaire used by Fairbrother (2008).
The items in the nationalism scale were (Cronbach’s alpha .77):
1. China’s policy decisions are almost always right. (31.3.)
2. China is the best country in the world. (5.9.)
Table 1. Sample Characteristics










Town/small city 306 (41.5%)
Medium-sized city 150 (20.3%)
Urban 151 (20.5%)
Dissatisfaction with life
Very unsatisfied 7 (0.9%)
Not too satisfied 76 (10.3%)
Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied 165 (22.3%)
Satisfied 428 (57.7%)
Very satisfied 65 (8.8%)
Self-assessed social ranking on a scale of 1 to 10
Three Top levels 54 (7.4%)
Three Middle levels 395 (54.5%)
Four Bottom levels 276 (38.1%)
Travel abroad during the past 3 years
Has been abroad 107 (14.4%)
Has not been abroad 634 (85.6%)
CCP membership
CCP member 111 (15.1%)
Probationary member 71 (9.7%)
Not a member, but has applied for membership 140 (19.1%)
Not a member, but has planned to apply for membership 65 (8.8%)
Not a member 347 (47.3%)
Perceived threat from the United States 750 3.63 .67
Perceived threat from Japan 751 3.63 .78
Media consumption 743 3.68 .60
Interest in politics 769 3.28 .70
Nationalism 735 2.98 .58
Patriotism 738 4.09 .49
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3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese. 
(5.4.)
4. I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong. (5.11.)
5. I think that the Chinese people are the finest people in the world. (6.1.)
6. Chinese foreign policies are almost always morally correct. (31.1.)
7. Generally speaking, China is a better country compared to most other countries. (5.6.)
The items of the patriotism scale were (Cronbach’s alpha .82):
1. I am glad to be Chinese (6.11.).
2. I am very proud to be a Chinese (6.5.).
3. I love my country (5.12.).
4. I often regret that I am Chinese. (reverse coded) (6.2.)
5. Being Chinese is an important reflection of who I am. (6.3.)
6. I would like personally to help my country attain its goals. (6.7.)
7. How close do you feel to the following?—China (3.3.)
Means and standard deviations of both scales are included in Table 1.
Media consumption was compiled from answers to one question measuring the frequency of 
following different types of media sources. Here the response format ranged from 5 (every day) to 
1 (never). The more the respondent followed these media sources, the higher their score was on the 
media measure.
Items measuring media consumption were:






6. Party newspapers or publications other than People’s Daily
The Chinese public in general relies heavily on television as a source of information. Because of 
its popularity, television is one of the most controlled media in China (Brady, 2012; Reilly, 2012). 
Compared to the media-consumption patterns of the whole Chinese population, we find that, as 
expected, elite university students watch television much less as only 5% of the students watch 
television “almost every day or every day,” 27% of them watch it often, and the large majority of 
students only watch television occasionally (64%). Magazines and newspapers are more popular 
than television, as 36% often read magazines and 29% report the same regarding newspapers. Most 
students (58%) listen to domestic radio occasionally. The majority never reads People’s Daily or 
Party newspapers other than People’s Daily.
In addition to reporting their media consumption, respondents were asked about the perceived 
effect they think the media has on their opinions. Twenty-six percent disagreed or disagreed strongly 
with the statement “The way I think about China has a lot to do with what I hear on television or read 
in the newspaper.” Almost a third of respondents were indecisive on this matter (27%), but the largest 
share of students agreed (47%) that the media influences their views on China. Despite acknowledg-
ing media influence, the majority (58%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “Television and 
newspapers are biased in what they report about national affairs.” Thirty-seven percent of respondents 
chose “neither agree nor disagree” and only 5% disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.
276 Sinkkonen and Elovainio
Interest in politics was measured with two items. The response format ranged from 5 (strongly 
agree) to 1 (strongly disagree) for the statement on interest in domestic politics and 4 (“very inter-
ested”) to 1 (“not at all interested”) for the statement on international politics.
The items measuring interest in politics were:
1. I do not have much interest in national affairs. (Reverse coded) (7.1.)
2. How interested would you say you personally are in international politics? (36)
The youngest age groups tend to be less interested in politics than older age cohorts. In addition to 
Chen’s (2001) samples collected in 1995, 1997, and 1999, this trend can be identified in the Texas 
A&M University’s (2008) China Survey and in the World Values Survey’s China sample from 2012. 
Contrary to the views of young people in general, elite university students can be described as quite 
interested in both domestic and international politics and, thus, politically aware.
Sixty-three percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I do 
not have much interest in national affairs.” Eleven percent agreed or agreed strongly whereas 26% 
chose “neither agree nor disagree.” Seventy-two percent reported they were fairly or very interested 
in international politics; only 2% said they were “not at all interested,” and 26% reported being “not 
so interested.”
Statistical Analysis
The analysis was conducted in three steps. First, correlations of threat perceptions and explan-
atory variables (nationalism, patriotism, media consumption, and interest in politics) were tested. 
Second, the associations between explanatory variables and threat perceptions were tested using 
multivariate linear regression models. Third, the associations were further tested with linear regres-
sion models including the contribution of other potential explanatory factors to the relationships. 
Also, interaction terms between media and interest in politics were tested. All the analyses were 
performed using STATA 13 (StataCorp LP) statistical package.
Results
Table 2 shows that perceived threats from the United States and Japan were positively cor-
related. Nationalism was positively correlated with both U.S. and Japan threat variables. Patriotism 
was significantly correlated with perceived threat from the United States and nationalism, but the 
correlation of patriotism and a Japanese threat did not achieve an accepted level of statistical signifi-
cance. Consumption of media was positively correlated with perceived threat from the United States 
and Japan, as well as nationalism and patriotism. Interest in politics was positively correlated with 
perceived threat from the United States and Japan, nationalism, patriotism, and media consumption.
Table 2. Correlation Matrix on Threat Perceptions and Proposed Explanatory Variables
U.S. Threat Japan Threat Nationalism Patriotism Media
Interest in 
Politics
U.S. threat 1.000 – – – – –
Japan threat .50*** 1.000 – – – –
Nationalism .12** .10** 1.000 – – –
Patriotism .09* .07 .42*** 1.000 – –
Media .36*** .60*** .11** .09** 1.000 –
Interest in politics .18*** .11** .32*** .10** .11** 1.000
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Multivariate models (Table 3) revealed that media consumption (p < .001) and interest in politics 
(p <  .001) were significantly associated with perceived threats from the United States and Japan. 
Nationalism (p < .01) was significantly associated with perceived threat from the United States but 
not with that of Japan. Patriotism was not significantly associated with perceived U.S. threat, and its 
p-value was slightly above the threshold also with regards to a Japanese threat.
Table 3. Multivariate Models of Perceived Threats From the United States and Japan
Perceived Threat from the United States Perceived Threat from Japan
Media consumption .46/.34 (.05)*** .94/.59 (.05)***
Interest in politics .14/.15 (.04)*** .07/.06 (.04)*
Nationalism .09/.08 (.04)** .06/.04 (.04)
Patriotism −.06/−.04 (.05) −.10/−.06 (.05)
Constant 1.42 (.25)*** −.12 (.25)
R2 .15 .36
Adj. R2 .15 .36
N 735 736
Note. Entries are unstandardized/standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 4. Multivariate Models of Perceived Threats from the United States and Japan Including All Available Explanatory 
Factors
STD-Beta t-Value p-Value
Perceived threat from the United States
Media consumption .33 8.48 <.001
Interest in politics .12 2.88 <.001
Patriotism −.02 −.48 .63
Nationalism .04 .99 .32
Gender .03 .78 .44
Age .04 .97 .33
Place of origin −.04 −.89 .34
Dissatisfaction with life .05 1.14 .26
Self-assessed social ranking .02 .60 .55
Travel abroad .02 .52 .61
CCP membership <.01 .03 .98
University −.04 −.93 .36
R2 .16
Adj. R2 .14
Perceived threat from Japan
Media consumption .63 18.92 <.001
Patriotism −.08 −2.11 .04
Interest in politics .05 1.38 .17
Nationalism .02 .48 .63
Gender −.02 −.61 .54
Age .01 .33 .74
Place of origin −.03 −.96 .34
Dissatisfaction with life .05 1.61 .11
Self-assessed social ranking −.02 −.65 .51
Travel abroad .02 .45 .66
CCP membership −.03 −.96 .34
University <.01 −.04 .96
R2 .41
Adj. R2 .39
Note. The figures are standardized regression coefficients, t-values, and p-values.
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In stage three, associations examined in multivariate models were tested further. Table 4 presents 
linear regression models, which show the adjusted associations of explanatory variables with perceived 
threats from the United States and Japan and the contribution of potential confounders to the relation-
ships. Perceived threat from the United States was significantly associated with media consumption 
and interest in politics even when control variables were entered into the model. However, at this stage, 
nationalism turned statistically insignificant. In other words, those who used conventional media more 
and were interested in politics were more likely to view the United States as a threat to China.
Perceived threat from Japan was associated with media consumption. Interest in politics turned 
insignificant at this stage. Of the value-related variables, nationalism remained insignificantly associ-
ated with perceived threat from Japan, but patriotism turned significant: Those who were more patri-
otic were less likely to see Japan as a threat. In sum, those who consumed more conventional media 
and scored low on the patriotism scale were more likely to view Japan as a threat to China. In general, 
threat perceptions from both the United States and Japan and explanatory variables were quite robust 
to adjustments for all covariates considered. The linear regression models tested explained a rela-
tively large amount of the variance of perceived threat from the United States (16%) and Japan (41%).
Finally, there was a significant interaction effect between the amount of media consumption and 
interest in politics related to perceived threat from Japan (β = .26, p < .001), but not from the United 
States (β = .10, p = .073). The association was stronger between media consumption and perceived 
threat from Japan when interest in politics was also higher (β = .57 vs. β = .62). Of the consumed 
individual-media types, television (β = .12, p < .001), newspapers (β = .09, p < .001), and magazines 
(β = .38, p < .001) were related with perceived threat from the United States and all but domestic 
radio with perceived threat from Japan (the β -range was from −.09 in People’s Daily to .77 in mag-
azines, all p-values < .001).
Conclusion
This research studied how personal and situational factors shape threat perceptions of the US 
and Japan among Chinese elite university students. Media consumption mattered more than pre-
sumed whereas nationalist and patriotic values were found less significant in comparison. In a con-
text in which Chinese regime applies increasingly repressive measures on the media, media’s role 
in building and maintaining enemy images may be in the increase. Even elite university students, 
who themselves acknowledge that the media is biased in its reporting, are strongly influenced by the 
negative news. On the other hand, the findings also raise new questions on the relationship between 
national attachment and foreign policy attitudes, as the two types of national attachment studied were 
associated with threat perceptions in ways that are somewhat contradictory with previous research.
Our findings revealed that students perceive the US and Japan as threats to China. However, 
educated Chinese respondents’ threat perceptions on the US and Japan were built differently: while 
media consumption was the strongest predictor of perceived threat from both countries, perceptions 
of Japan were more influenced by it. Interest in politics was significantly associated with the US 
threat perception but not with that of Japan. Finally, respondents scoring high on the patriotism scale 
were less likely to perceive Japan as threatening.
Consequently, the first hypothesis on nationalism and threat perceptions was not confirmed. 
Nationalism was significantly associated with the US threat perception in stage two, but turned in-
significant when all the background factors were included in the model. Second, those who follow 
“mainstream” media, such as television, People’s Daily or Party publications were more likely to 
view the US and Japan as threats confirming hypothesis two. Hypothesis three, according to which 
interest in politics should increase the likelihood to perceive Japan and the US as threats, was only 
confirmed with regard to perceived threat from the US.
There was a significant interaction effect between the amount of media consumption and interest 
in politics related to perceived threat from Japan, but not from the US. When media consumption was 
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high, people with high interest in politics found Japan more threatening. However, increasing media 
consumption intensified threat perceptions of Japan also among those with lower interest in politics. 
In contrast, Gries and Sanders (2015) identified a different pattern in analysing threat perceptions of 
the US. In their sample, media consumption was defined by interest in politics, and respondents with 
low and high interest in international affairs reacted in opposite ways to increased exposure to news. 
In Gries’ and Sanders’ research (2015), for those with low interest in politics, increase in media con-
sumption decreased perceived threat from the US, whereas for those with high interest in politics, it 
intensified threat perceptions.
It could be that negative content on Japan widespread in Chinese entertainment, plays a role in 
shaping threat perceptions and explains in part why threat perceptions on Japan were not defined 
by interest in politics: One does not need to follow news media to be exposed to negative portray-
als of Japan. At this point, we have limited empirical research on how entertainment might shape 
people’s views on Japan. Naftali (2018) interviewed Chinese middle-school students from various 
backgrounds. Some of them mentioned TV shows as a factor contributing to their negative impres-
sion of Japan. However, students from elite schools were very critical of TV dramas, described them 
as unrealistic and denied that TV shows had influenced their views. These findings are in line with 
the media bias elite university students’ in our survey recognized. The question remains, how much 
media influence people’s views even though they would describe them as biased in some ways?
As earlier research (Gries et al., 2011; Sinkkonen, 2013) has found a stronger connection be-
tween nationalism and international issues in contrast to patriotism, it is interesting that patriotism 
was significantly associated with perceived threat from Japan whereas nationalism was insignificant. 
It can be that nationalism has clearer links with other foreign policy relevant issues, which were not 
studied in this article.
Those with higher scores on the patriotism scale were less likely to perceive Japan as a threat. 
Moreover, neither nationalism nor patriotism was significant with regards to the perceived threat from 
the US in the final stage. There is little previous research to contextualise this finding using similar 
methodology applied in this research. Although much of the literature on Chinese national identity 
and nationalism tends to portray nationalism as something that will push China to adopt more aggres-
sive foreign policies, there are few studies with empirical substance on relations between nationalism 
and foreign policy attitudes on the one hand, and nationalism and actual foreign policies on the other 
hand (Carlson, 2009; Johnston, 2013). Based on a sample collected in 2007, Sinkkonen (2013) found 
that “patriots” were in favour of international cooperation and they held similar views with “national-
ists” only on Taiwan independence. It could be that higher scores on the patriotism scale indicate the 
kind of national self-esteem, which does not require elevating China above other countries and allows 
a less emotionally loaded assessment of Japan’s military power. More research is needed to study the 
associations of patriotism and threat perception and patriotisms’ links with foreign policy issues more 
broadly. Unfortunately, we cannot say much more on this association based on this dataset.
What was clear however, was that consumption of mainstream media increases threat perceptions. 
The exposure-acceptance model predicts that elite university students should be hard to influence by 
views presented in the media, but nonetheless media has a big role in constructing threat perceptions. 
Naturally the fact that East China Sea issue was topical at the time the survey was collected may 
have played a role in increasing negative news content on Japan, resulting in more widespread threat 
perceptions in this study. Media consumption had a strong association with threat perceptions and the 
background variables did not change these relationships. Moreover, the multivariate models explained 
a rather large part of the variance, which further emphasises the explanatory power of media con-
sumption with regards to threat perceptions on Japan and the US. Recent research on Chinese media 
suggests that both commercial and non-commercial media outlets produce news in which Japan and 
the US are shown in more negative light than before. The strong role of media consumption in the 
formation of Chinese threat perceptions of the US and Japan implies that media marketization may 
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have started a vicious cycle of negative news coverage, resulting in deteriorating images of the US and 
Japan. As China shows increasingly authoritarian tendencies which affect the style of reporting in the 
media, there is a continuing need to study how public opinion reacts to changes in societal dynamics.
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